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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
Case No. 890129 
This brief is submitted by Richard S. Smith (hereinafter 
"Smith") in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
filed by Rocky Mountain Helicopters (hereinafter "Rocky 
Mountain") on April 7, 1989. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The questions presented for review by Rocky Mountain's 
Petition are stated on page 1 of Rocky Mountain's brief. 
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REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
All relevant reports and opinions issued by the Court of 
Appeals are attached to Rocky MountainTs brief, 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Smith asserts that this Court does not have jurisdiction by 
reason of the untimely filing of the Petition (See argument under 
Point I, infra). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Smith is unaware of any constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations that would be controlling in 
this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the rights of the parties 
with respect to 11,445 shares of stock issued by Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters pursuant to the terms of a contract that was 
wrongfully terminated by Rocky Mountain, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January, 1981, Plaintiff-Appellant, Richeird Smith 
(hereinafter "Smith") entered into an employment contract with 
Defendant-Respondent Rocky Mountain Helicopters (hereinafter 
"Rocky Mountain"). The primary negotiator for Rocky Mountain was 
its acting President, Jim Burr (hereinafter "Burr") (Tr. 17). 
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The initial contract was in all practical aspects an 
employment contract whereby Smith was to act as Vice President of 
Finance in exchange for a salary and incentive bonus. 
One of the primary duties of Smith under the employment 
contract was to locate a buyer and negotiate a sale of all of the 
stock and/or assets of Rocky Mountain to a third party. (R. 291) 
However, as Smith attempted to perform his obligations, he was 
repeatedly hampered by the actions of Burr and other Rocky 
Mountain officers. First, Rocky Mountain secretly issued 58,000 
shares of Rocky Mountain stock to Burr and his brother thereby 
diluting the interest of all other shareholders, including Smith. 
By reason of Smith's objections, the new issue of stock to Burr 
was cancelled (Tr. 43-44). However, the transaction was 
distracting and hampered Smith's efforts to perform his 
obligations. Second, when Smith successfully performed his 
primary duties and obtained a Letter of Intent from a buyer (the 
buyer was called Offshore Logistics Company) committing to the 
purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain (Tr. P-9), 
Burr suddenly changed his mind and refused to pursue the stock 
sale (Tr. 46-50). Finally, despite Smith's attempts to perform 
his obligations, Burr attempted to unilaterally amend the 
employment agreement by limiting Smith's authority and thereby 
impairing his ability to perform. (Ex. P-ll) 
Rocky Mountain's repeated interference with Smith's 
performance caused a significant dispute to arise between the 
parties. (R. 294) However, the parties succeeded in compromising 
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their differences by preparing new agreements which were 
designated as a "consulting agreement" and an "escrow agreement" 
(Tr. 109). The escrow agreement specifically stated that all 
prior agreements were superceded and that the new agreements 
constituted the sole agreements between the parties (Exs. P-13 & 
P-14). It is the consultation agreement and escrow agreement 
that are the subject matter of this litigation. 
Before summarizing the terms of the consulting and escrow 
agreements, it should be noted that pursuant to the prior 
employment agreements, Smith was issued 11,445 shares of Rocky 
Mountain stock as partial consideration for services under the 
prior agreements. (Ex. P-7) 
Under the new Consulting Agreement, Smith was to be employed 
by Rocky Mountain for the period of one year. His principal 
assignment was to sell the company or raise equity funding. 
Smith, in turn, agreed to place his 11,445 shares of Rocky 
Mountain stock, (Cert. #103) in escrow. This agreement was 
memorialized in a writing dated February 15, 1984, which 
consisted of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Smith and Burr 
and an Escrow Agreement prepared by Rocky Mountain's attorney, 
Jerry Thorn. The actual signing of the Escrow Agreement was 
February 27, 1984 (Exs. P-13 & P-14). 
Under the Consulting Agreement, Smith's principal assignment 
involved activities towards the goal of either selling Rocky 
Mountain or adding additional equity to the company. He would 
also act as an agent of Rocky Mountain in his efforts to raise 
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equity capital and function as a financial or corporate planning 
advisor to Burr and Rocky Mountain in whatever areas they might 
see fit. 
The consulting agreement provided that for his consulting 
services, Smith would receive consideration in the amount of 
$275.00 per day or $137.50 per half day for the time that Smith 
spent rendering consulting services for the Company. Smith was 
also to receive the benefit of having his medical and dental 
insurance paid for by the Company and continued life insurance 
and associated health insurance. 
Under the consulting agreement, Smith received his income 
taxes prepared for the 1983 tax year, $1,000.00 worth of spousal 
travel upon approval, use of the Xerox machines and use of the 
Watts lines for personal use only. Smith was given an Oldsmobile 
automobile and four new tires for the car in exchange for accrued 
vacation, sick time and separation benefits. Smith was to receive 
50 gallons of gasoline per month and an agreement was provided 
for the exchange of Smith's receivables from the Windgate Oil for 
a Suburban automobile. (Ex. P-13) 
The Escrow Agreement, which is dated February 17, 1984, 
provided that the was to be understood by Rocky Mountain and 
Smith, that this Escrow Agreement superceded all prior agreements 
and was the sole agreement between the parties governing the 
disposition of stock (Ex. P-14). 
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The Agreement also provided as follows: 
"If, at any time during the one-
year from the date of this 
a g r e e m e n t , ROCKY M O U N T A I N 
HELICOPTERS, INC., is sold to a 
third party, or parties, either by 
virtue of a majority of its assets 
being purchased, or, in the 
alternative, any public or private 
sale of its stock or the stock of 
any subsidiary takes place, then in 
that event, the shares of stock 
represented by the certificates 
deposited herewith will be returned 
to Richard S. Smith; provided that 
if any negotiation for the sale of 
assets or stock have begun prior to 
the expiration of one year from the 
date hereof, that result in such a 
sale, then and in that event, such 
sale will be considered to have 
occurred within the one year 
previously mentioned herein. 
Provided further that in the event 
the conditions described herein do 
not occur within one year from the 
date of this agreement, then stock 
represented by Certificate # 
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTER, INC. 
During the latter portion of 1983, there was a crash of one 
of Rocky Mountain's insured helicopters. Pursuant to ein existing 
agreement between the shareholders, the insurance proceeds were 
required to be distributed to some of the shareholders in 
accordance with their proportionate shares. This disbursement 
was accomplished in early 1984 (Tr. 152). Later, the company 
requested that the shareholders return their proportionate share 
of the insurance proceeds. Burr became upset with Smith when 
Smith refused to return the money (Tr. 149). 
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As a result of this argument concerning the ownership of the 
insurance proceeds from the helicopter crash, Rocky Mountain 
sued Smith on April 16, 1984. Three days later, on or about 
April 19, 1984, the suit was settled. Based on this law suit, 
and other factors, the relationship between Rocky Mountain and 
Smith was strained. (R. 298) 
On March 4, 1984, Smith officially resigned as a Director of 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters. In his formal letter, Smith stated: 
"this no way affects my availability and willingness to continue 
to serve under the Consulting Agreement in areas that are deemed 
appropriate, and particularly with respect to efforts to sell the 
Company or equity therein'1. (Ex. D-27) 
On April 23, 1984, Smith's Consulting Agreement with Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters was terminated by Burr as president of Rocky 
Mountain. (Ex. P-20) The trial court specifically found that 
this termination by Rocky Mountain was wrongful (R. 299-300) 
This case was submitted to the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park. 
The lower court held that there was a valid employment contract 
between plaintiff and defendant. (R. 299) The lower court 
further held that Rocky Mountain had breached the contract by 
wrongfully terminating Smith, and, as such, Smith was entitled to 
Judgment against the defendant Rocky Mountain as follows: 
(a) $600.00 for gasoline benefit 
(b) $2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses 
the plaintiff incurred during the term of the 
Consulting Agreement. 
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Notwithstanding this holding, the Court held that Rocky 
Mountain was entitled to the return from the escrow agent of the 
11,445 shares of Company stock inasmuch as the Consulting 
Agreement and Escrow Agreement provided for the return of stock 
in the event the Company was not sold or a public or private sale 
of equity was not effected (R. 299-300), The Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that 
inasmuch as the consulting agreement had been wrongfully 
terminated, Smith was entitled to the 11,445 shares of stock. 
(Opinion of the Court of Appeals as attached as Appendix "A" to 
Rocky Mountainf s brief). 
POINT I 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BY 
REASON OF UNTIMELY FILING 
Rocky Mountain's Petition should be denied by reason of the 
fact that it was not timely filed. In this regard, Rule 45, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides as follows: 
"(a) A Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari must be filed with the 
Clerk of this Court within 30 days 
after the entry of the decision by 
the Court of Appeals. . . . . (c) the 
time for filing a Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari runs from the 
date the decision is entered by the 
Court of Appeals, not from the date 
of the issuance of the Remittitur. 
If, however, a Petition for 
Rehearing is timely filed by any 
party, the time for filing the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for 
all parties (whether or not they 
requested rehearing or joined in 
the Petition for Rehearing) runs 
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from the date of the denial of 
rehearing or the entry of a 
subsequent decision entered upon 
the rehearing." (Emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals denied Rocky Mountain's Petition for 
Rehearing by order dated March 6, 1989 (See Appendix "B" to Rocky 
Mountain's Petition for Writ of Certiorari). The Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was not filed until April 7, 1989, which is 32 
days from the date of the rehearing denial.1 
Rocky Mountain made no motion to extend the time for filing 
the petition pursuant to Rule 45(e) of this Court's Rules and the 
time permitted to file such a motion has expired. Rule 45(e), 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. If the filing deadline with 
respect to a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is viewed by the 
Court in the same manner as the filing requirements for direct 
appeals, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant Rocky Mountain's 
petition. Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen 
vs. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson vs. Stoker, 
669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). Even if the untimely filing is not 
considered as a jurisdictional matter, Rocky Mountain has 
nevertheless violated the mandatory filing deadline stated in 
Rule 45. 
xThe thirtieth day fell on a Wednesday. Thus, there is no extension by reason of a weekend 
or holiday. 
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POINT II 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BY REASON OF 
THE ABSENCE OF ISSUES WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF RULE 43 
The absence of any issues justifying the issuance of a Writ 
of Certiorari is apparent by a history of this case. This appeal 
was originally filed with this Court2 and thereafter referred to 
the Court of Appeals. The same factors which prompted the Court 
to not hear the original appeal should be considered with respect 
to hearing at this time. 
It is clear that two (2) of the three (3) issues raised by 
Rocky Mountain's Petition are outside the scope of the guidelines 
stated in Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See 
"Questions Presented for Review" on page 1 of Rocky Mountain's 
Petition). The only issue that is remotely related to these 
guidelines is the claim that the lower court misinterpreted the 
holding of a prior decision of this Court. The other two issues 
relate to weighing of the evidence presented at trial and a 
claimed invasion by the Court of Appeals into the province of the 
trial court. Neither of these matters are appropriate for 
consideration by the Court pursuant to a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari under Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Rocky Mountain makes no effort whatsoever to argue why the 
granting of the petition would serve the purposes stated in Rule 
2The case number assigned to the matter at the time of its initial filing with this Court 
was Case No. 870265. 
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43. It is readily apparent that Rocky Mountain merely seeks a 
repeat of the appellant review that has already been performed by 
the Court of Appeals. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED PRINCIPLES 
STATED BY THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
Under Section "A" of Point I of its brief, Rocky Mountain 
claims that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the holding 
of this Court as stated in Fleming vs. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 
Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712 (1958). It is interesting to note that 
"
t i^e
 Fleming case was not cited in Rocky Mountain's brief to the 
Court of Appeals or in oral argument before that Court. 
Rocky Mountain argues that the lower court in the Fleming 
case found that "the performance of a condition or promise was, 
in fact, prevented by Plaintiff" (Rocky Mountain Memo. p. 11). 
With great reliance on the word "prevented", Rocky Mountain 
argues that the appellant court's interpretation of Fleming was 
unjustified because the trial court in this action failed to find 
that Smith's performance was not "completely frustrated" or 
"prevented". 
It is readily apparent that Rocky Mountain, not the Court of 
Appeals, misinterprets the Fleming decision. The holding of the 
Fleming case did not require that the employee's performance be 
"completely frustrated" or "prevented". On the contrary, the 
Fleming decision required only that the employee's tendered 
performance be refused by the employer who wrongfully terminated 
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the employment contract. The relevant wording of the opinion is 
as follows: 
"However, the finding was made that 
notwithstanding the fact that, 
'Plaintiff [Fleming] kept or offered to 
keep and to perform all of the 
provisions of said agreement1 th€> 
Defendants 'refused to permit Plaintiff 
to carryout his duties as general 
manager' and terminated his status as 
such, 'without any reason or cause, 
provocation or excuse and [his duties] 
were wrongfully transferred to Joseph H. 
Felt1". 
The facts of the instant case likewise establish that Rocky 
Mountain "refused to permit Smith to carryout his duties...and 
terminated his status" thereby making the Fleming decision an 
appropriate precedent in this matter. The finding of the lower 
court in this matter, that the termination of the consultation 
agreement did not "completely frustrate and prevent [Smith] from 
finding a buyer for the company..." is superfluous to its 
decision. It is readily apparent that the Court of Appeal 
likewise regarded this superfluous finding as irrelevant to the 
issues (See Opinion of Court of Appeals, p. 6, fn. 1 cittached to 
Rocky Mountain's Petition as Appendix Ex. A). 
If the finding that Smith was not prevented from performance 
is considered as a finding of fact, it is wholly unsupported by 
any evidence in the record. However, Smith asserts that the 
"finding" is more appropriately characterized as an erroneous 
legal conclusion. 
Under Rocky Mountain's argument, an employee whose employer 
wrongfully terminates his employment contract must nevertheless 
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appear at work and attempt to perform his employment duties 
despite the revocation by the employer of any authority to 
perform such functions. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
LIKELIHOOD OF PERFORMANCE 
Under Section "B" of Point I of its Petition, Rocky Mountain 
claims that Smith did not introduce sufficient evidence to 
establish that he would have performed if Rocky Mountain had not 
wrongfully terminated the consulting agreement. In this regard, 
the problem of "what would have happened but for the tort or 
breach of contract" arises in many different settings. It is 
readily apparent that no Plaintiff has a "crystal ball". By 
reason of such a situation, the authorities hold that a party 
whose performance was not permitted by wrongful termination, may 
be treated or considered as though he had performed. 17A C.J.S. 
§468; See Gibbs vs. Whelan, 239 P.2d 727 (New Mex. 1952); Weaver 
vs. Williams, 317 P.2d 1108 (Ore. 1957); Bewick vs. Mechan, 156 
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1945); Pacific Venture Corporation vs. Huey, 104 
P.2d 641 (Cal. 1940); Overton vs. Vita-Food Corporation, 210 P.2d 
757 (Cal. 1949). 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Smith was required 
to establish that performance would have occurred if the 
consulting agreement had not been wrongfully terminated, Smith 
satisfied such requirement to the extent possible by one not 
having the ability to foresee the future. In this regard, 
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pursuant to the predecessor employment contract with Rocky 
Mountain, Smith obtained a letter of intent from a buyer 
committing to the purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain 
(Tr., p. 9; Findings of Fact, para. 13). The proposed 
transaction was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors 
of Rocky Mountain (Findings of Fact, para. 13). However, Mr. 
Burr, the president of Rocky Mountain, suddenly changed his mind 
and refused to pursue the sale (Tr. 46-50). This evidence 
demonstrated Smith's ability to locate a buyer and obtain an 
acceptable commitment to purchase. Furthermore, Smith repeatedly 
demonstrated competence and ingenuity in financial matters. He 
restructured Rocky Mountain's financial position by adopting new 
accounting procedures; he refinanced corporate indebtedness with 
a discount in favor of the company of approximately $750,000.00; 
he favorably negotiated a dispute with preferred shareholders on 
terms more favorably to the corporation than prior proposals and 
secured releases from the preferred shareholders with respect to 
claims asserted by them (Findings of Fact, para. 4). 
It is readily apparent, on the basis of these facts, there 
was evidence in the record that performance would have likely 
occurred. It is further apparent that Rocky Mountain had a 
genuine belief that Smith would perform inasmuch as the 
corporation agreed to compensate him for his services prior to 
the time he succeeded in finding a buyer. 
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POINT V 
TERMINATION OF THE CONSULTING AGREEMENT 
ALSO TERMINATED AUTHORITY TO ACT 
In Section "C" of Point I, Rocky Mountain attacks the 
statement by the Court of Appeals that the wrongful termination 
of the consulting agreement stripped Smith of his authority to 
bargain on behalf of the company. In order to find some basis 
for such an argument, Rocky Mountain characterizes the Court's 
statement as a unjustified factual determination and contends 
that Smith was required to ignore the express termination of the 
consulting agreement and become some sort of "free lance" 
negotiator devoting his time and talents to the business of Rocky 
Mountain in the hope that the company would graciously consent to 
compensate him for any success with a consideration of 
undetermined value. 
An agency relationship is consensual. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency 
§17; Restatement (Second) of Agency, §15. A person cannot 
unilaterally obtain authority to act on behalf of a principal who 
does not grant such authority, Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
§430. It is clear from the wording and purpose of the consulting 
agreement that the termination of the agreement simultaneously 
terminated any authority on the part of Smith to act for and on 
behalf of Rocky Mountain. 
Mr. BurrTs testimony at trial that he had a subjective and 
undisclosed intention that the termination of the consulting 
agreement did not effect Smith's authority to act, is irrelevant. 
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A secret belief that one is authorized to act, especially when 
the belief is inconsistent with the overt acts in terminating a 
contract which provides authority, does not create an agency 
relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency, §15. If Smith had 
continued to act after the contract granting his authority to act 
had been terminated, he would have subjected himself to personal 
liability. Restatement (Second) of Agency, §430. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Smith submits that Rocky 
Mountain's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this 0\ day of April, 1989. \ 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Respondent 
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